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DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT ABORTIONS
BASED ON FETAL ANOMALY?: EXAMINING THE
POTENTIAL FOR DISABILITY-SELECTIVE
ABORTION BANS IN THE AGE OF PRENATAL
WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING

reer onley*
This Note examines whether the state or federal government
has the power to enact a law that prevents women from obtaining
abortions based on their fetus’s genetic abnormality. Such a ban has
already been enacted in North Dakota and introduced in Indiana
and Missouri. I argue below that this law presents a novel state
intrusion on a woman’s right to obtain a pre-viability abortion.
Moreover, these pieces of legislation contain an outdated understanding of prenatal genetic testing—the landscape of which is
quickly evolving as a result of a new technology: prenatal whole genome sequencing. This Note argues that the incorporation of this new
technology into clinical care will both invigorate anti-choice legislatures to pursue such legislation and cause the laws’ impact on women
to be greater than initially anticipated. Using the undue burden
standard announced in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, this Note
concludes that federal and state disability-selective abortion bans are
unconstitutional based on the Due Process Clause. The Note also
questions whether the federal government has constitutional authority under its enumerated powers to even enact such a ban. Finally,
the Note presents policy reasons for why such an abortion ban will
degrade the right to a pre-viability abortion so significantly as to
render it non-existent.
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INTRODUCTION
Every month, legislation is introduced at the state and federal level
that attempts to chip away at a woman’s right to choose. With the emergence of a cutting-edge reproductive technology set to enter clinical care in
the next few years—prenatal whole genome sequencing—anti-choice legislators will have new fodder for attacks on abortion. This technology will
provide women with access to exponentially more information about their
fetus than ever before. It will also become the most cost-effective prenatal
testing technology to ever hit the market. The abundance of new information will undoubtedly impact women’s reproductive decision making, one
likely consequence of which will be an increase in abortions based on fetal
anomaly, at least when the technology is first offered in clinical care.
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In this Note, I argue that the use of this new technology to inform
reproductive decisions will create legislative pressure to outlaw abortions
based on the disability of the fetus. This kind of legislation has already been
championed in various states. In August 2013, the first state abortion ban
based on the genetic abnormality of the fetus was signed into law in North
Dakota. Other such state bans have been proposed in Missouri and Indiana.
Moreover, four states have enacted, and nine states have introduced, sexselective abortion bans; one state has even enacted a race-selective abortion
ban. These types of laws (“reasons-based abortion bans”1) have also made
some federal traction. In 2012, the Federal House of Representatives proposed a law that would make it a criminal offense for physicians to perform
abortions solely due to the sex of the fetus.
Many of these reasons-based abortion bans have been touted as civil
rights bills—a way to protect vulnerable populations, including the disabled
community, from discriminatory conduct. The disability2 angle, as opposed
to sex or race, is the most compelling given the evidence that most fetuses
with genetic abnormalities are aborted when women learn that they will
have one of the few disabilities traditionally tested for with prenatal genetic
testing. While race- and sex-selective abortion bans are also being proposed,
there is little to no evidence that such abortions are actually occurring in the
United States.
This Note analyzes the constitutional issues arising from laws that attempt to limit abortions based on genetic information about the fetus.
1. By reasons-based abortion bans, I mean laws that prevent only women who have
certain reasons for choosing an abortion from actually receiving that abortion. Currently, states have enacted bans against sex-, race-, and disability-selective abortions.
See infra Part III. Reasons-based abortion bans are different from the types of laws
commonly seen regulating abortions in that they ban abortions that are procured
due to certain “undesirable” reasons. Until now, the regulation of abortion has been
predominately limited to the gestational age of the fetus, the information women
must receive in order to receive an abortion, the types of facilities that are permitted
to provide abortions, or the type of procedure performed. Regulations like these
apply widely to all women meeting certain criteria in a given jurisdiction. Reasonsbased bans apply to only some women who society decides have “bad” reasons for
choosing abortion, despite being on the same plane as other abortion-seeking
women in all other respects.
2. In this Note, I often conflate the term “disability” with “genetic abnormality.” They
are distinct concepts—many genetic abnormalities will not constitute disabilities (for
instance, variants of unknown significance discussed in Table One), while some disabilities are not genetic (for instance, injuries leading to amputation). However, there
is also considerable overlap between the two terms. Throughout this Note, I use the
two terms interchangeably because the differences are not relevant to the argument.
For clarity’s sake, however, when I refer to disability-selective abortion bans, I am
generally referring to the recent legislation that bans abortion based on genetic abnormality of the fetus.
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Looking at current Supreme Court jurisprudence, I discuss the many ways
in which such bills are constitutionally problematic. In Part I of this Note, I
provide a technological background on whole genome sequencing. I describe how quickly and inexpensively it will enter clinical care, why it might
cause a rise in abortions, and ultimately, how it will spur a backlash from
the anti-choice and disability rights communities. In Part II, I provide an
overview of a North Dakota law that bans abortions based on the genetic
abnormality of the fetus. I also describe the federal sex-selective abortion
ban that was proposed in 2012. In Part III, I examine whether the Constitution empowers Congress to create a federal reasons-based abortion ban
under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, or Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. I conclude that it does not. Finally, in Part
IV, I assess how state laws—and federal laws, if courts find that Congress
possesses such authority—would raise deep due process issues and place an
undue burden on women seeking an abortion after prenatal whole genome
sequencing. This legal analysis is bolstered by policy concerns that judicial
approval of a disability-selective abortion ban would empower legislatures to
continue outlawing abortions for any “undesirable” reason, which would
place the right to a pre-viability abortion in serious jeopardy.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PRENATAL GENETIC TESTING: UNDERSTANDING
HOW PRENATAL WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING WILL DRAMATICALLY
ALTER THE PRENATAL TESTING LANDSCAPE
A. Traditional Model (1970s–2000s)
The science of prenatal genetic testing is rapidly evolving. Until a few
years ago, the archetypal model involved offering prenatal genetic testing
only to women who were at an increased risk of having a child with certain
conditions.3 Factors considered in this analysis included the age of the
mother, family history of disease, ethnicity of the parents, and/or an abnormal ultrasound or test.4
Once a determination of increased risk was made, a pregnant woman
had the option of fairly invasive genetic testing procedures that would require taking a sample from either the placenta or amniotic sac with a large
needle inserted through either the cervix or the abdomen.5 These proce3. Wylie Burke et al., Genetic Screening, 33 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 148, 155–56
(2011).
4. See id.
5. See Kristine Barlow-Stewart & Mona Saleh, Prenatal Genetic Testing–CVS and Amniocentesis, CENTRE FOR GENETICS EDUC., http://www.genetics.edu.au/Publications
%20and%20Resources/Genetics-Fact-Sheets/FS17C.pdf (last updated May 2012).
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dures carry with them a risk of miscarriage that has historically been between 0.2% and 1%. There is additionally a range of other rare, but serious,
risks attached to the procedure.6 The invasiveness of the test has had a negative impact on demand, causing many women who might otherwise be interested in learning genetic information about their fetus to forgo the
procedure to avoid discomfort.7 Less than 2% of pregnant women each year
choose to undergo these tests.8
Under the traditional model, once the genetic material had been extracted, it was tested for a finite number of serious conditions.9 Such conditions include Down Syndrome, Turner Syndrome, Patau’s Syndrome,
Edwards Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Cystic Fibrosis, Tay Sachs Disease,
Thalassemia, Muscular Dystrophy, Fragile X Syndrome, and Anencephaly.10
These conditions are all very serious11 and are expected to have a significant
impact on the life of the child and the parents caring for him or her. This
assumes that the child survives the first few years of life, which—for many
of these conditions—is not common.12 Moreover, the genes marking these
conditions are all genetically highly penetrant (“diagnostic”), meaning that
if the genetic marker is present, it will almost certainly produce the manifestation of the trait in the individual who possesses it.13
Due to the invasive nature of the procedure, coupled with the limited
number, and rare occurrence, of the tested diseases, it was relatively uncommon for women to undergo prenatal genetic testing.14 When they did, the
conditions tested for were rare enough that the test did not frequently produce any medically relevant information.15 However, if parents received pos6. Id. Additional risks include needle injury, leaking amniotic fluid, Rh sensitization,
infection, and infection transmission. Amniocentesis, THE MAYO CLINIC, (Oct. 10,
2012), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/amniocentesis/MY00155/DSECTION=
Risks.
7. Henry T. Greely, Get Ready for the Flood of Fetal Gene Screening, 469 NATURE 289,
289 (2011).
8. Id.
9. Greer Donley, Sarah Chandros Hull & Benjamin E. Berkman, Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing: Just Because We Can, Should We?, 42 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28,
29–30 (2012).
10. Fetal Screening, Diagnostic and Screening Tests, FETALSCREENING.COM, http://www.
fetalscreening.com/conditions_tests.php (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
11. Donley et al., supra note 9, at 29.
12. U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Anencephaly, Expectations (Prognosis), PUBMED HEALTH,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0002547/ (last updated May 1,
2011); U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Tay Sachs, Expectations (Prognosis), PUBMED
HEALTH, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0002390/ (last updated
Nov. 2, 2012).
13. Donley et al., supra note 9.
14. Greely, supra note 7.
15. Donley et al., supra note 9, at 33.
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itive test results indicating that their child had one of these conditions, the
result would be diagnostic16 and carry with it the dramatic information that
the child will suffer from a serious disease. Given that this information is
both diagnostic and severe, the presence of these conditions was assumed to
be relevant to parents’ reproductive decision making. Indeed, one primary
purpose of these prenatal tests has always been to afford parents the option
to terminate the pregnancy in case of a positive test result.17 Data from
United States and Europe suggest that between 92–93% of parents who
learn through prenatal genetic testing that their child will have Down Syndrome choose to terminate the pregnancy.18 The presence of other conditions for which the traditional model tested also correlates to abortion. For
example, 61–67% of parents choose to terminate for Spina Bifida, 82–86%
for Anencephaly, and 69–75% for Turner Syndrome.19
However, given the rarity of the conditions and the infrequency with
which women are tested, abortions based on this information have been
relatively uncommon—only about 13–14% of women who have received
an abortion reported that their reason for doing so was a potential health
problem with the child.20 And when such abortions have occurred, they
have been surprisingly uncontroversial. In 2007, 70% of Americans polled
indicated that they believed women should be permitted to obtain an abortion “if there is a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby.”21 That is
compared with the 49% of Americans who self-identified as pro-choice in
2007.22 Moreover, Virginia23 and Mississippi have permitted Medicaid
16. By diagnostic, I mean highly penetrant genetic conditions whose presence almost
certainly means the manifestation of the condition. This will later be contrasted to
susceptibility genes, whose presence indicates an increased likelihood, but not certainty, of developing a condition. Donley et al., supra note 9.
17. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE OPINION NO.
410, ETHICAL ISSUES IN GENETIC TESTING 3 (2008), available at http://www.acog.
org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committee%20on%20Ethics/co410.pdf?
dmc=1&ts=20130922T1415295393.
18. Caroline Mansfield, Suellen Hopfer & Theresa M. Marteau, European Concerted
Action, Termination Rates After Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome, Spina Bifida,
Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter Syndromes: A Systematic Literature Review, 19
PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 808, 810 (1999).
19. Id.
20. Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 110, 113 (2005),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3711005.pdf.
21. Amy Harmon, Genetic Testing + Abortion = ???, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/weekinreview/13harm.html.
22. Abortion, GALLUP (Sept. 22, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/
abortion.aspx.
23. In 2012, a bill was introduced in Virginia to repeal this coverage. Laura Bassett,
Virginia Abortion, Contraception Bills Proposed In New Legislative Session, HUF-
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funds to be used for abortions in cases of severe fetal defect (where funds are
otherwise restricted to only cover abortions after rape, incest, or when the
life of the mother is threatened).24 Some states like Maryland and Utah,
which ban abortions after viability, provide exceptions to this ban for fetal
anomaly.25
This is not to say that termination decisions based on traditional prenatal tests have ever been, or are now, wholly uncontroversial. There has
been a significant backlash from the disability rights community regarding
termination decisions based on this information—most notably in the
Down Syndrome community.26 Due to the limited scope of traditional prenatal genetic testing and the severity of the conditions tested for, prenatal
genetic testing has remained an instrumental part of prenatal care despite its
implications for abortion.27
B. The Current Reality: Recent Shifts Resulting from Various New Prenatal
Genetic Testing Technologies (2010–Present)
A major change in prenatal genetic testing occurred in 2010, when
two independent research groups were able to isolate the fetal genotype
from a simple maternal blood sample.28 This means that recently, women
receiving care in certain prenatal centers have been able to obtain prenatal
genetic testing with a non-invasive blood draw as early as ten weeks into
their pregnancy.29 This not only removes the invasive aspect of the test, but
also opens up the potential for more widespread testing: “Checking for hundreds or thousands of traits with one blood test, early in pregnancy, could
move prenatal genetic testing from uncommon to routine.”30 With this test,

24.
25.
26.

27.

28.
29.
30.

FINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/04/virginia-abortion-contraception_n_2410445.html.
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS
(2013), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf.
Id.
See, e.g., Bristol Palin: Don’t Abort Down Syndrome Babies, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 15, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/15/bristol-palin-abortion-down-syndrome_n_1518154.html; Stephanie Pappas, Fetal Testing Could Intensify Abortion Wars, LIVESCIENCE (Nov. 1, 2012, 3:22 PM), http://www.livescience.
com/24472-fetal-genetic-testing-abortion-wars.html.
See Mary M. Murry, Prenatal Genetic Screening: Is it Right for You?, Posting in Pregnancy and You Blog, MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.mayoclinic.com/
health/prenatal-genetic-screening/MY01966.
Greely, supra note 7.
FAQ: Cell-Free Fetal DNA Testing, UCSF MED. CENTER, http://www.ucsfhealth.org/
education/cell-free_fetal_dna_testing/ (last visited Aug 15, 2013).
Greely, supra note 7.
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a simple blood draw from the pregnant woman could be tested for any
known genetic marker.31
This new technology is emerging in a unique context. Although just
beginning, the understanding of human genomics is growing quickly. In the
past few decades, due to the increase of whole genome sequencing research,
the genetic markers for a rapidly increasing number of conditions have been
discovered—as of October 2012, over 20,000 individual human genes have
been identified.32 At the same time, the functions of more than 90% of the
genes in the human genome remain unknown.33 Thus, the world is changing from one of prenatal genetic testing where only a small number of severe, diagnostic conditions could be detected to one in which thousands of
conditions (soon to be hundreds of thousands) can be ascertained, many of
which are neither diagnostic nor severe.34 For example, scientists have already expressed concern regarding the implications of prenatal genetic testing for the genes associated with breast cancer, which is on the horizon.35 It
may go without saying that reproductive decisions based on the fetus’
chance of developing breast cancer are more controversial than decisions
based on more traditional information regarding conditions like Down Syndrome or Tay Sachs.
Though these non-traditional tests have become more available in recent years, at this point, parents have to be proactive to get them. They are
not the standard of care,36 and thus are offered by only a limited number of
facilities. Doctors do not frequently offer testing for diseases outside of the
conventional list, so parents who utilize this new technology must seek it
out themselves, often as a result of their own medical histories of the condition.37 For example, a woman who knows she carries the breast cancer gene
might look for facilities that can provide fetal testing for this marker. This
31. Greely, supra note 7, at 290.
32. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRIVACY AND
PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING 18, 19 (2012).
33. Data is current as of 2010. Amy L. McGuire & James R. Lupski, Personal Genome
Research: What Should the Participant Be Told?, 26 TRENDS IN GENETICS 199, 200
(2010); see also Kelly E. Ormond et al., Challenges in the Clinical Application of
Whole-Genome Sequencing, 375 THE LANCET 1749, 1749–51 (2010).
34. Donley et al., supra note 9, at 28–30; PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY
OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 32, at 19–22.
35. Claire Julian-Reynier et al., BRCA1/2 Carriers: Their Childbearing Plans and Theoretical Intentions About Having Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 GENETICS IN MED. 527, 527–528 (2012).
36. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDELINE SUMMARY: SCREENING FOR FETAL CHROMOSOMAL
ABNORMALITIES (2011), available at http://www.guidelines.gov/content.aspx?id=
10921.
37. Julian-Reynier, supra note 35, at 527.
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new technology is still in its nascent form so its impact on the prenatal
setting has not yet been fully realized and remains confined to a small subset
of women.38
C. The New Frontier: Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing
In July of 2012, Nature published the first account of fetal whole genome sequencing through a maternal blood sample.39 This technology is currently only being used in the research setting, but it will likely be clinically
available in the near future. Prenatal whole genome sequencing will reveal
not only severe, diagnostic information, but also an array of new genetic
information for which the traditional model never tested. This new information has been grouped into five categories: variants of unknown significance, non-medical genetic information, genes indicating carrier status,
susceptibility genes, and late-onset genetic markers.40 When compared to
the prenatal information tested for under the traditional model (diagnostic
information about severe diseases), these categories yield information that is
less dramatic and less determinative of the quality of life that the parents
and the child will have.41 This is both because the presence of a genetic
marker might be less certain to manifest in the child and because the conditions tested might be less physically symptomatic and painful. Not only will
this deluge of information raise new ethical issues,42 it will also make termination decisions based on this information more common and controversial, especially as the technology is first introduced into clinical care.
Currently, due to the relative scarcity of prenatal genetic testing—and
the rareness of the genetic conditions that traditional genetic tests diagnose—few parents must face the profoundly difficult and complicated deci38. However, the fact that the technology is available has nevertheless caused controversy
in the past five years. Harmon, supra note 21.
39. H. Christina Fan et al., Non-invasive Prenatal Measurement of the Fetal Genome, 487
NATURE 320 (2012); Krista Conger, New Method Enables Sequencing of Fetal Genomes Using Only Maternal Blood Sample, STANFORD SCH. OF MED. (July 4, 2012),
http://med.stanford.edu/ism/2012/july/genome.html.
40. For definitions, see infra Table One. These categories are not absolute and can bleed
into one another, but are a good way to conceptualize the new information this
technology will generate. Donley et al., supra note 9, at 30; PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 32, at 19.
41. Donley et al., supra note 9, at 30; PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 32, at 19.
42. Some ethical concerns that have been raised are (1) an interference in the future
autonomy of the child—i.e. taking away the child’s right not to know their genetic
information later in life; (2) an increase in the role that genetic determinism plays in
child-rearing, and (3) a change the concept of a normal, healthy pregnancy. Donley
et al., supra note 9, at 28–40.
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sions that result from learning that their child will have a genetic
abnormality. This will no longer be the case with prenatal whole genome
sequencing, which will reveal some unfortunate medical information for
every fetus. For example, after sequencing the exomes43 of healthy twin children in 2012, thirty-two variants associated with disease were revealed.44
This underscores the reality that within every person’s genome are numerous genetic markers implicating one’s health. As described in Table One,
most of this fetal genetic information will be neither severe nor diagnostic
(in contrast to the conditions tested for in the traditional model), but rather
non-diagnostic genetic information regarding less serious conditions. Some
information will even be completely unrelated to the health of the child.
However, while most of the generated information will be less serious, the
volume of data produced will be exponentially greater.45

43. Exomes constitute only 1% of the genome but are believed to contain 85% of all
disease-causing mutations. European Soc’y of Human Genetics, Exome Sequencing
Gives Cheaper, Faster Diagnosis in Heterogeneous Disease, Study Shows, SCIENCEDAILY
(June 25, 2012), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/06/120625064746.
htm.
44. Benjamin D. Solomon et al., Incidental Medical Information in Whole-Exome Sequencing, 129 PEDIATRICS e1605, e1607 (2012).
45. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 32,
at 20–21.
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TABLE ONE: NEW INFORMATION GENERATED BY PRENATAL WHOLE
GENOME SEQUENCING46
Categories of Information Definition

Example(s)

Variants of Unknown
Significance (new)

VUS are variations in a genetic sequence whose
association with disease risk is, by definition,
unknown; however, because they are often found
in regions associated with important health
functions, they are thought to potentially be
associated with health conditions.

N/A

Non-medical Genetic
Information (new)

Non-medical genetic information can predict
characteristics that are unrelated to the health of
the fetus, and rather related to physical or
emotional traits.

Athletic ability, loyalty,
hair color, sex47

Genes Indicating Carrier
Status (new)

If a child is a carrier of a genetic condition, then
once s/he reaches reproductive age and decides
to have children, his/her offspring would be at risk
of having that condition only if his/her partner is
also a carrier for the same condition.

Ability to pass on Cystic
Fibrosis or Tay Sachs to
one’s offspring

Susceptibility Genes (new)

Susceptibility genes are genetic markers of low or
variable penetrance that suggest a genetic
predisposition, or increased statistical likelihood,
for developing a disease

Breast cancer, heart
disease, diabetes

Late-Onset Genetic
Conditions (new)

Genetic conditions that generally do not have any
impact on a person’s health until later in life.

Alzheimer’s Disease,
Huntington’s Disease

Severe, Diagnostic Genetic
Information (traditional
model)

Severe, diagnostic medical information reveals
highly penetrant genetic markers (genes whose
presence is almost certain to lead to a given
condition) for conditions that will have a highly
significant impact on the life of the child.

Down Syndrome, Tay
Sachs

Given this complicated landscape of new genetic information, parents
may struggle to figure out how a result revealing twelve variants of unknown
significance, five susceptibility genes, one carrier status, various undesirable
non-medical indicators, and a condition of late-onset ought to weigh into
their reproductive decisions. While most of these conditions on their own
might not alter one’s reproductive decision making, the barrage of information might have a cumulative impact, despite the fact that similar test results
are present in the genomes of many healthy adults. Results from traditional
prenatal tests may have been more devastating given the severity and certainty of the condition, but presented comparatively straightforward choices
for women and couples to make. In contrast, the decisions faced by parents
after receiving prenatal whole genome sequencing information will involve
46. Donley, supra note 9, at 30-32.
47. Even though this Note concerns the difficulties in abortion bans based on the
genetic abnormality of the fetus ascertained through this new technology, prenatal
whole genome sequencing will also reveal the sex of the child at an earlier date than
currently available and could have an impact on the demand for sex-selective
abortion. Thus, even though sex-selective abortion is not specifically addressed in
this Note, the concept is implicated within this technology.
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highly complicated formulations of risk and severity across many potential
conditions. Given the contentiousness surrounding any abortion decision
(even ones based on severe, diagnostic genetic information), termination
decisions based on this less significant information are likely to be highly
controversial. The 70% approval rate for abortions based on severe genetic
abnormality may plummet once suspicions surface that women are receiving
abortions based on much less serious medical information. This will engender a severe backlash from the anti-choice community.
Moreover, whereas the traditional model offered prenatal genetic testing only to individuals whom physicians believe are more likely to have
certain highly penetrant and serious conditions, whole genome sequencing
will be applicable to a broader population. Because every fetus will be at risk
for something for which prenatal whole genome sequencing can test, every
woman will suddenly become a good candidate for the procedure. Further,
this increased information will not be financially prohibitive in the near
future—most believe the $1,000 genomic sequence is in sight.48 This is not
only less expensive than traditional prenatal testing, but produces substantially more information for the cost.49 These two factors, combined with the
ability to get genomic testing with a non-invasive blood sample, will immediately increase the demand for prenatal testing services. In other words, not
only will the test reveal significantly more information, but will also be offered to, and sought out by, significantly more women.
The increased mass of information generated by whole genome sequencing, broader population of women to obtain it, and greater controversy over abortion decisions that result from it, create the perfect climate
for anti-choice legislatures to enact disability-selective abortion bans. These
bans will prevent certain women from receiving a pre-viability abortion; for
that group of women, such laws are the most restrictive abortion regulations
enacted since Roe. Below I analyze whether the federal government has the
constitutional authority to create a federal ban. After concluding it does not,
I argue that states are also prohibited from enacting these bans under the
Due Process Clause.

48. Ivan Karabaliev, The $1,000 Genome Is Almost Here—Are We Ready?, SCI. AM. (Oct.
15, 2012), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2012/10/15/the-1000genome-is-here-are-we-ready/.
49. Donley et al., supra note 9, at 31.
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II. AN EXAMINATION OF THE NORTH DAKOTA GENETIC ABNORMALITY
ABORTION BAN AND OTHER PROPOSED REASONS-BASED
ABORTION BANS
A. State Level
In March of 2013, North Dakota became the first state to sign into
law a ban on abortions performed solely based on the disability or sex of the
fetus.50 Indiana and Missouri have introduced nearly identical bills that
would also ban abortion based on the sex or genetic abnormality of the
fetus.51 Four states—Arizona, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania—have
enacted sex-selective abortion bans;52 nine others have introduced such
bans.53 Arizona is the only state to have also enacted a race-selective abortion ban.54 While the Center for Reproductive Rights is challenging the
North Dakota law, it remains in effect as of November 2013.55
The anti-choice group Americans United for Life (“AUL”) supported
the North Dakota bill.56 The organization made it their objective in 2012 to
encourage legislation banning abortions based on the sex or genetic abnormality of the fetus.57 AUL’s 2012 policy guide (entitled “Bans on Abortions
for Sex Selection and Genetic Abnormality”) created model language for
state and federal governments to use in enacting such legislation.58 The
AUL document cites the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as its
50. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1–04.1 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); North
Dakota Becomes First State to Limit Abortions Based on Sex-Selection and Genetic Abnormalities Using AUL Model Legislation, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE (Mar. 26, 2013),
http://www.aul.org/2013/03/north-dakota-becomes-first-state-to-limit-abortionsbased-on-sex-selection-and-genetic-abnormalities-using-aul-model-legislation/ [hereinafter North Dakota Becomes First].
51. S. 183, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013); H.R. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013).
52. North Dakota Becomes First, supra note 50.
53. Dayna Lovelady, At Least 9 States Considering Bills to Ban Sex-Selective Abortions,
CHRISTIAN POST (Mar. 6, 2013, 1:27 PM), http://www.christianpost.com/news/atleast-9-states-considering-bills-to-ban-sex-selective-abortions-91318/.
54. Bob Christie, Arizona Race And Sex-Selective Abortion Ban Draws ACLU Lawsuit,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/05/29/arizona-abortion-ban-race-sex_n_3355493.html.
55. Two of North Dakota’s Four New Laws To Restrict Abortions Will Take Effect
Today, INFORUM (July 31, 2013), https://secure.forumcomm.com/?publisher_ID=
1&article_id=407776.
56. North Dakota Becomes First, supra note 50.
57. AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, BAN ON ABORTIONS FOR SEX-SELECTION AND GENETIC
ABNORMALITIES: MODEL LEGISLATION AND POLICY GUIDE (2011), available at
thttp://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Sex-Selective-and-Genetic-Abnormality-Ban-2012-LG.pdf.
58. Id.
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legal authority.59 Given that the ADA prohibits discrimination based on
disability,60 proponents of disability-selective abortion bans might use the
ADA as a framework to demonstrate that these abortions are illegally
discriminatory.61
Under the North Dakota law, the following conduct is a class A misdemeanor (punishable by up to a year in prison):62
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a physician may
not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion
with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely: (a) on account of the sex of the unborn child; or (b)
because the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality.63
The statute defines genetic abnormality as “any defect, disease, or disorder
that is inherited genetically. The term includes any physical abnormality,
scoliosis, dwarfism, Down Syndrome, albinism, Amelia, or any other type of
physical or mental disability, abnormality, or disease.”64 Due to this broad
definition of abnormality, the law would likely cover most, if not all, information generated by prenatal whole genome sequencing.
This recent trend toward enacting abortion bans, coupled with the
explicit encouragement of various anti-choice groups to continue down this
path, signals the willingness of legislatures to push forward with such reasons-based abortion legislation. The upcoming controversy surrounding
prenatal whole genome sequencing will likely rejuvenate that legislative predisposition, creating a unique environment in which the target may change
from sex-based abortion bans to abortion bans based on the genetic abnormality of the fetus.

59. Id.
60. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101–12213 (Westlaw
through 2013 P.L. 113-31).
61. This Note does not analyze whether the ADA actually supports abortion bans based
on fetal anomaly. Because I conclude that these bans are unconstitutional, the ADA
analysis becomes moot. I mention it above only to note that proponents of these
bans use the ADA as a justification for their enactment. Whether or not this is true,
it becomes irrelevant in light of their unconstitutionality.
62. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-01 (Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
63. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04.1 (Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
64. Id.
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B. Federal Level
The Prenatal Non-Discrimination Act (“PRENDA”) was proposed in
the federal House of Representatives in 2012.65 It was first introduced as
“the Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination
Act of 2011,” and imposed civil and criminal penalties for performing abortions based on either the race or sex of the fetus.66 By the time the House
voted on the bill in 2012, however, the bill no longer contained the racebased provision.67
While PRENDA did not ban abortions based on the disability of the
fetus, it was a reasons-based ban that was also crafted as an anti-discrimination statute.68 Congress purported to rely on many powers in proposing
PRENDA, including the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper
Clause, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Section 5”).69 Because an appropriate use of Section 5 powers requires a demonstration of
state action involving a “widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights,”70 PRENDA contained a section purporting to uncover a
widespread practice of sex- and race-selective abortions.71 However, the
bill’s findings were exceptionally inadequate when measured against the Supreme Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence.72 For instance, the legislators did
not point to any discriminatory state action, nor did they present data
describing the rate of sex-selective abortions in the United States.73 This lack
of relevant data was one factor contributing to the perception that
PRENDA was not a bill aimed at improving sex-equality, but rather a bill
attempting to prevent abortion in any way possible.74 Despite all of
PRENDA’s problems, it still managed to get a majority of votes in the

65. Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2012, H.R. 3541, 112th Cong. (2012).
66. Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2011,
H.R. 3541, 112th Cong. (2011).
67. H.R. 3541 (2012).
68. H.R. 3541 § 2a(1)B (2012) (“United States law prohibits the dissimilar treatment of
males and females who are similarly situated and prohibits sex discrimination in
various contexts, including the provision of employment, education, housing, health
insurance coverage, and athletics.”).
69. H.R. 3541 § 2b (2012).
70. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997).
71. H.R. 3541 § 2a(1)C-H (2012).
72. See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507; see infra Part III(C).
73. H.R. 3541 § 2a(1)I (2012).
74. Sex Selection Abortion Bans Are Harmful to Women, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENTER
(May 29, 2012), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/sex-selection-abortion-bans-areharmful-women.
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House (246-168).75 However, because the bill was brought up for vote during a suspension of the rules, it required a two-thirds majority and fell short
of the 276 votes it needed to pass.76
The data demonstrating that disability-based abortions are occurring
in the United States is much more robust.77 Whereas the findings in
PRENDA present no data of sex-selective abortion in the United States, the
fact section in AUL’s model legislation for abortions based on genetic abnormalities78 is comparatively damning: “Various studies have found that
between 70 percent and 100 percent of unborn children diagnosed with
genetic abnormalities are aborted.”79 While this is certainly not dispositive,
this data does make the Section 5 analysis appear more persuasive at first
glance, and might encourage federal legislators to attempt to create a disability-selective abortion ban in the near future.
III. ENUMERATED POWERS: CONGRESS LACKS THE AUTHORITY
ENACT A FEDERAL DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION BAN

TO

The power to enact federal laws banning abortions based on the genetic abnormality of the fetus could come from three distinct sources of
power, each of which PRENDA purported to rely on: the Commerce
Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. I argue that each of these sources of power is inadequate and,
therefore, that any federal reasons-based abortion ban would be
unconstitutional.
Under modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress must show
that there is a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce in order to
regulate an activity.80 Because an abortion ban cannot be justified as economic legislation, but is rather a congressional attempt to regulate areas
typically reserved to the states, the Court should invoke federalism principles to determine that Congress lacks the power to pass such legislation.
This is consistent with the Court’s holdings in United States v. Morrison81
75. H.R. 3541 (112th): Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2012 (On Motion
to Suspend the Rules and Pass, as Amended), GOVTRACK.US (May 31, 2012), http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/112-2012/h299.
76. Kate Sheppard, House GOP’s ‘Prenatal Nondiscrimination’ Bill Fails, MOTHER JONES
(May 31, 2012, 12:36 PM) http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/05/housegop-abortion-sex-selection.
77. Mansfield et al., supra note 18.
78. See supra note 2 for a discussion comparing the terms “disability” and “genetic
abnormality.”
79. AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 57.
80. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
81. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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and United States v. Lopez.82 If the Court is persuaded that protecting certain state spheres of regulation renders the Commerce Clause invalid, the
Court will be unlikely to uphold a federal abortion ban under the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Recent precedent in National Federation of Independent
Business (“NFIB”) v. Sebelius83 demonstrates that the Court will be hostile
towards arguments that the Necessary and Proper Clause independently
grants the government authority, in light of the established federalism concerns, to legislate when lacking other constitutional authority. Finally, Section 5 certainly does not provide Congress with the power to pass this
legislation, as the Constitution does not accord personhood to a fetus; consequently a fetus is not subject to equal protection of the laws and the federal government has no unconstitutional discrimination to remedy.84 I give
a detailed discussion of each source of power in turn below.
A. Commerce Clause
In 1995, Commerce Clause jurisprudence changed dramatically with
the holding in United States v. Lopez.85 Before that decision, the Court’s
interpretation of the Commerce Clause permitted Congress to enact legislation that had any effect on interstate commerce, even in areas typically reserved to the states.86 After Lopez, an appropriate use of Commerce Clause
powers required Congress to show that it was regulating one of three things:
(1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or (3) conduct that has a significant economic effect on
interstate commerce.87 As with the majority of modern Commerce Clause
legislation, an abortion ban based on the genetic abnormality of the fetus
would be analyzed through the third category of Lopez (as was the statute in
Lopez itself).88 I therefore restrict my analysis to that category.
The Court held in Lopez that the link between national productivity
and the possession of a firearm in a school zone was too attenuated for the
law to qualify as a significant economic impact on interstate commerce.89
This was later affirmed in United States v. Morrison, where the Court struck
down a portion of the Violence Against Women Act after concluding that
violence against women does not have a substantial economic effect on in82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (emphasis added).
See generally, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600–02.
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terstate commerce.90 In doing so, the Court observed four problems with
the statute in Lopez that helped it to analyze the relevant provision of the
Violence Against Women Act and ultimately conclude that it was also unconstitutional.91 Because the Court used its opinion to reflect on and succinctly state its past holding in Lopez, Morrison presents a useful lens
through which to view the Court’s current Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
First, in reviewing the relevant provision of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, the Court highlighted that the “noneconomic, criminal nature
of the conduct at issue was central to our decision.”92 This was because the
provision was “a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might
define those terms.”93 Thus, the activity in question must be “some sort of
economic endeavor.”94
Second, the Court noted that in Lopez, the statute at issue lacked any
reference to an impact on interstate commerce in its legislative history.95
Such a legislative footprint allows the Court to defer to Congress’ judgment
on whether a regulation would have an impact on interstate commerce that
was not clearly apparent.96 It also bolsters an argument that the ultimate
aim of the law is economic in nature.
Third, the Court explained that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
lacked a “jurisdictional” element that would ground the prohibited conduct
in interstate commerce.”97 For instance, after Lopez struck down the GunFree School Zones Act, Congress reenacted the law with added legislative
history mentioning the economic impact of guns in schools, as well as a
jurisdictional element that restricted the regulation to guns that had traveled
through interstate commerce.98 While the amended Gun-Free School Zones
Act has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit found
that the changes adequately addressed the Commerce Clause issues and that
the amended Act was thus constitutional.99 There remains doubt, however,
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–13.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
Seth J. Safra, The Amended Gun-Free School Zones Act: Doubt As to Its Constitutionality Remains, 50 DUKE L.J. 637, 638–39 (2000).
99. United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005).
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as to whether the amended Act is actually constitutional given that the
changes were largely superficial.100
Finally, the Court noted that the statute in Lopez had an effect on
interstate commerce that lacked proximity and was too attenuated.101 In
other words, because restricting guns in school zones was not closely related
to the purported economic effect, the Lopez Court was hesitant to permit
the enactment of the law under a constitutional provision that dealt with
commerce.102 Moreover, a highly attenuated connection to interstate commerce will make the Court suspicious of whether or not a law was really
passed for an economic reason, or whether the justification is being retroactively attached to the law in attempt to survive judicial review.
Using this four-factor test, the Morrison Court held that the federal
government also lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to enact federal legislation that allowed victims of gender-based violence to sue their
attackers in federal court.103 As justification for rejecting the government’s
argument that permitting these federal suits would significantly affect interstate commerce, the Court pointed to principles of federalism: “The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the
instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has
always been the province of the States.”104 This federalism concern was also
fundamental in the Lopez opinion, where the Court held that an expansive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause would destroy the purpose of enumerated powers.105 For this reason, the government’s national productivity
argument, which attempted to demonstrate that a firearm possession law
would substantially affect interstate commerce, was deemed insufficient to
permit federal legislation:
Under the Government’s “national productivity” reasoning,
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to
the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (in100. Safra, supra note 98, at 661–62.
101. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
102. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615–17. The Court reiterates this point in Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 3–4 (2005), where it held that the personal growth of medial marijuana
could still be regulated under the Commerce Clause because it was ultimately an
economic endeavor: “The laws at issue in Lopez and Morrison had nothing to do
with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise . . . . In contrast, the CSA
regulates quintessentially economic activities: the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate
market.”
103. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
104. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–19.
105. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
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cluding marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example.
Under the theories that the Government presents in support of
§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we
were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed
to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without
power to regulate.106
In both cases, the Court was concerned about federal encroachment into
spheres of regulation that state police powers had generally governed. By
narrowing the kinds of activities that the government can regulate to matters that are economic in nature and have a significant effect on interstate
commerce, the Court has reserved certain areas of the law to the states.
If a federal abortion ban based on the genetic abnormality of the fetus
were enacted, it would not meet the “substantial economic impact” test
enumerated in Lopez and confirmed in Morrison. The logic underlying the
Supreme Court’s holding in both cases applies with equal force over a federal abortion regulation. A federal disability-selective abortion ban is not
intended to regulate economic activity, but rather to assert the government’s
moral disapproval of these abortions. Such legislative action from the federal
government, which lacks general police powers, infringes on protected rights
of states to regulate the health and safety of its citizens:
Throughout our history the several States have exercised their
police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens.
Because these are “primarily, and historically, . . . matter[s] of
local concern,” the “States traditionally have had great latitude
under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the
lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.107
Given that “by long tradition, the health and safety of the people is left to
the States as matters of local concern,”108 states have generally governed the
regulation of medical practice and been protected from unreasonable federal
encroachment in this area. For instance, in 2006, the Supreme Court held
that the federal Controlled Substances Act could not be used to prosecute
physicians who assist in the suicide of terminally ill patients in Oregon,

106. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
107. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (citations omitted).
108. United States v. Regenerative Sciences, LLC, 878 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (D.D.C.
2012).
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where physician-assisted suicide is legal.109 This holding was based in part
on a recognition that the medical profession is generally regulated under a
state’s police powers and that the federal government should not invalidate a
reasonable state position on medical practice just because it is at odds with
the federal government’s views.110
If the Court was concerned in Morrison and Lopez about federal encroachment into state police powers, a federal disability-selective abortion
ban should be equally troubling to the Court. Such a ban would grant the
federal government power to regulate medical practice, an area historically
reserved for the states. This is only more apparent for the regulation of
abortion, which involves vastly different, and regionally correlated, public
opinions. In this case, states would be in the best position to legislate regional values—so long as states do not violate the undue burden analysis
discussed infra, their unique position to legislate in this area should be protected as part of their established police power to regulate areas involving
public health and safety. “The Constitution requires a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local;” if this holding is to have
force, then courts should prevent the federal government from regulating
the truly local issue of reproductive decision making.111
The effect of disability-selective abortion on interstate commerce is
highly attenuated at best, just as in both Lopez and Morrison. For instance,
the economic impact analysis provided for PRENDA, contained in a report
issued by the Committee on the Judiciary, was weak. It first estimates the
amount spent on abortions each year: “approaching one billion annually.”112 The report then highlights that some women travel across state lines
to obtain an abortion; however, there is no data provided on how frequently
this occurs. Rather, the reader is left to infer from information on the lack
of availability of abortion facilities in different counties that that women in
counties without abortion facilities must travel to obtain an abortion.113
The critical question left unaddressed, however, is how many women actually travel out of state to obtain an abortion as a result of not having an
abortion provider nearby. Regardless of this logical hole, the bill concludes
that “abortion impacts interstate commerce.”114
This argument is flawed for the following reason: the relevant question
is not whether abortions generally have a significant impact on commerce,
109.
110.
111.
112.

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006).
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 269–74.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 617–18.
H.R. REP. NO. 112-496, at 29 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-112hrpt496/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt496.pdf.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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but whether disability-selective abortions significantly impact interstate commerce. In other words, Congress must restrict their economic analysis to the
specific conduct their legislation regulates.115 As this law was not a general
abortion regulation, but a disability-selective abortion regulation, the economic impact analysis should be limited. The figures citing the annual cost
of abortion are not specific to disability-selective abortion, which only accounts for 13–14% of abortions generally,116 and are not limited to abortions performed across state lines. Therefore, the numbers are misleading. In
reality, the amount spent on disability-selective abortions procured across
state lines is likely quite small and the report provides no figures to estimate
it.
Any legislative history that attempts to demonstrate a link between
disability-selective abortion and interstate commerce will be a mere pretext—the goal of this legislation is moral, not economic. If the Court suspects that Congress might have doctored the legislative history to satisfy the
third category of Morrison, it will not be given much weight. In fact, this
was the case in Morrison, where the Court overturned the law despite legislative findings that domestic abuse has an impact on interstate commerce
due to the Court’s perception that it was written in anticipation of potential
litigation.117 A compelling legislative footprint, therefore, must not only be
present in the documents, but also be genuine.
Finally, even if the law was to include a jurisdictional hook—for instance, if the law criminalized the practice of disability-selective abortions
on women who have traveled through interstate commerce—it would still
fail three of the four elements enumerated in Morrison. While the Amended
Gun-Free School Zones Act never reached the Supreme Court, which
would ultimately answer whether such a superficial jurisdictional hook
would also protect a disability-selective abortion ban, one could imagine the
Court would have similar problems with a jurisdictional fix as they have
with hollow additions to legislative history. Ultimately, it would not address
the substance of the law, which is the heart of the issue. If the ultimate
concern is federalism, the Court should be unreceptive to legislation that
fails to limit federal encroachment into protected state powers even if it
meets one or two elements of the four-factor Morrison test.
Moreover, Congress would never pursue such a jurisdictional hook in
this context. Unlike Lopez where nearly every gun will have traveled through
interstate commerce, many women seeking these abortions will be able to
115. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612–13 (2000).
116. Lawrence B. Finer, supra note 20.
117. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (“[T]he existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.”).
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obtain them without leaving their home state. Thus, adding this hook
would greatly reduce the law’s impact and Congress may be reluctant to
expend political energy in enacting such a weak law.
The Supreme Court has considered one challenge to a federal abortion
law in the aftermath of Lopez —a federal ban to abortions performed using
the Dilation and Extraction (“D&X”) procedure.118 While the ban was enacted using Commerce Clause powers, it was not challenged on Commerce
Clause grounds, and it was thus not an issue in that case.119 This is despite
the fact that the Act used the jurisdictional hook described in Lopez.120
Though the Court upheld the Act in the face of a Substantive Due Process
challenge, Justice Thomas notes in the first paragraph of his concurrence,
joined by Scalia, that “whether the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2013
constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce
Clause is not before the Court. The parties did not raise or brief that issue;
it is outside the question presented; and the lower courts did not address
it.”121 While the Court has yet to face such a question, the fact that two
Justices wrote a paragraph-long concurrence simply to note that the Commerce Clause issue was not raised might indicate that at least some members
of the Court would be receptive to an argument that federal abortion bans
are an inappropriate use of Commerce Clause powers.122
Based on the factors outlined in Morrison, the Court ought to hold
that the federal government lacks authority to enact federal abortion legislation under the Commerce Clause. First, Congress is not attempting to regulate an economic activity, but rather to regulate the medical profession
according to their moral judgments. Because this is an area typically reserved to the states,123 the Court should reject an understanding of this law
as economic regulation. Second, given that this legislation is truly about the
morality of abortion, any legislative history regarding the law’s economic
impact would appear doctored for litigation. As was determined in Morrison, legislative history that appears insincere will be rejected.124 Third, while
Congress could attach a jurisdictional hook to increase the likelihood of
surviving judicial review, it might be hesitant to do so if the hook would
reduce the law’s impact. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on
118. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146–47 (2007).
119. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120. The Act provides that “any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.” 18
U.S.C.A. § 1531 (Westlaw through 2013 P.L. 113-31).
121. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 169.
122. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 169.
123. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).
124. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
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whether the superficial addition of a jurisdictional hook could repair a law
that raised fundamental federalism issues. Finally, the highly attenuated link
between disability-selective abortion and interstate commerce will make the
Court question whether the regulation was really intended for an economic
purpose. If not, the federalism concerns resurface.
B. Necessary and Proper Clause
The most recent Supreme Court analysis of the Necessary and Proper
Clause occurred in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
(“NFIB”), where the Court ruled on the constitutionality of the Affordable
Care Act. In that decision, the Court departed from its traditionally broad
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. First, the Court noted
the history of the Clause, which has traditionally been “very deferential to
Congress’s determination that a regulation is ‘necessary.’ [The Court has]
thus upheld laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”125 While the Clause has historically been used
to further expand the powers of the federal government, the Court in NFIB
retreated from that position and declared that the Necessary and Proper
Clause is not without limits.126
The Court noted that the Necessary and Proper Clause is confined by
the fundamental structure of our government, which balances state and federal power. In NFIB, the Court held that the individual mandate portion of
the Affordable Care Act could not be enacted according to Commerce
Clause powers—this holding was a result of federalism-based concerns similar to those articulated in Lopez and Morrison.127 This reasoning was also
used in the Necessary and Proper Clause analysis. If federalism principles
require the Court to place limits on Congress’ power to legislate, those limits should extend to authority under both the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause:
But we have also carried out our responsibility to declare unconstitutional those laws that undermine the structure of government established by the Constitution. Such laws, which are not
“consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution,” are
not “proper [means] for carrying into Execution” Congress’s
enumerated powers. Rather, they are, “in the words of The Fed-

125. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591–92 (2012) (citations
omitted).
126. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592.
127. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591.

2013]

ABORTIONS BASED ON FETAL ANOMALY

315

eralist, ‘merely acts of usurpation’ which ‘deserve to be treated as
such.’”128
To ensure that the Necessary and Proper Clause is not invoked to
create new federal powers, the Court makes the distinction that “our prior
cases upholding laws under that Clause involved exercises of authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power.”129 Once the Court held that
the mandate could not be upheld under the Commerce Clause, the Court
concluded that upholding it under the Necessary and Proper Clause would
in essence confer Congress with a new power.130
The Court will be especially unlikely to find independent authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause after holding that principles of federalism prevent enactment of a federal law under the Commerce Clause.
This is made clear by the Court’s citation to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
in United States v. Comstock, which noted that “it is of fundamental importance to consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.”131 Thus, if the Court adopted my view that the Commerce Clause
is insufficient to grant the federal government power to enact a disabilityselective abortion ban, and that such a ban would raise serious federalism
concerns, it would dramatically alter the Necessary and Proper Clause analysis. If the Commerce Clause was insufficient, the Court would likely find
that upholding the law under the Necessary and Proper Clause would confer Congress with a new power, rather than facilitate the use of an enumerated power.
Understanding where to draw this line can be tricky. The Court in
NFIB clearly struggled to demarcate what additional power the Necessary
and Proper Clause provides Congress. However, NFIB makes clear that
when Congress lacks constitutional authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause because of federalism concerns, the Court will be suspicious
of the government’s attempt to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause as
independent authority to wash away these federalism worries. This is understandable given that concerns regarding federal intrusion into states’ police
power will persist regardless of which constitutional provision is considered
by the Court—if upholding the law based on the Commerce Clause implicates principles of federalism, so would upholding the law based on the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Given that a disability-selective abortion ban
128.
129.
130.
131.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
United States v.
concurring).

at 2592 (citations omitted).
at 2592.
at 2592–93.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967–68 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
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implicates federalism concerns because it attempts to legislate health and
safety issues traditionally reserved for the states, then it is irrelevant how
Congress attempts to justify this expansive intrusion into state action.
Ultimately, the Court will either find the act constitutional under the
Commerce Clause and uphold the law on those grounds, or maintain its
federalism argument throughout both the Commerce Clause and Necessary
and Proper Clause analysis.
C. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Just as Congress purportedly sought to enact PRENDA pursuant to
an appropriate use of Section 5 powers, a similar law penalizing state actors
who perform abortions based on the genetic abnormality of the fetus might
be justified by reference to this clause. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows the federal government to proactively legislate to prevent unconstitutional discrimination in a narrow set of circumstances.132 Proper use
of Section 5 powers requires Congress first demonstrate that a sufficient
number of equal protection violations exist to justify the creation of the
act.133 Even then, the act is only constitutional if there is congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented (as measured by real
constitutional violations of the Equal Protection Clause) and the means
adopted to meet that end.134
Because the Equal Protection Clause only applies to persons,135 the
first hurdle to overcome in this analysis would be the claim that fetuses are
persons protected by the United States Constitution. If the Court were to
accept this premise, it would have profound implications for other areas of
law. Not only would it jeopardize the substantive due process right to abortion,136 but it could also potentially justify prosecuting women who have
had abortions under various homicide statues. For this reason, the Supreme
Court held affirmatively that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment in Roe v. Wade.137 Without recognition as persons, the Equal Protection Clause does not extend its protections to fetuses,
and Section 5 powers cannot be appropriately invoked.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); see infra Part IV.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (“All this, together with our observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far
freer than they are today, persuades us that the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”).
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However, even if the Court were to overrule longstanding precedent
and endow fetuses with constitutional rights, a federal ban on disabilityselective abortions would still be unconstitutional. As mentioned above, the
Fourteenth Amendment only applies to discriminatory state action, and
consequently, Section 5 can only be invoked to correct state behavior.138
While there may be some state complicity in disability-selective abortions—
for instance, those abortions performed at state hospitals or using state
funds—it could never meet the standard pronounced in Boerne, which requires the remedy to be congruent and proportional to the injury.139 If the
injury involves state actors, a proportional remedy would be aimed at such
state action. A law like PRENDA, which criminalizes the actions of all physicians performing these kinds of abortions and not just the state actors,
extends the remedy far beyond the injury. This, of course, assumes an injury
exists at all under the Equal Protection Clause, which is unlikely given that
the disabled community is not a protected class and, even if it was, fetuses
are not people under the law.140
Ultimately, it is unclear whether Congress has the power to enact federal abortion legislation under any power, given that a Commerce Clause
challenge to federal abortion regulation has yet to go to the Supreme Court
since Lopez. Based on the Court’s holding in Morrison, such a federal law
triggers federalism issues by encroaching on the states’ police power to regulate the health of its citizens and the medical profession, and certain members of the Court might find such arguments persuasive.141 Based on the
analysis in NFIB, it seems equally unlikely that the Supreme Court would
permit the federal government to regulate based on the Necessary and
Proper Clause if it finds that Congress lacked the authority based on other
enumerated powers.142 Finally, Section 5 powers present the weakest argument upon which the federal government could rely. Given that fetuses
have never been defined as persons,143 and moreover, that disability has not
been granted heightened scrutiny for Equal Protection Clause analysis,144
Congress will be unable to find any unconstitutional state action upon
which to justify such a remedy.
138. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 522–24.
139. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508.
140. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (“[W]e conclude for several reasons that the Court of Appeals erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial
review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation.”).
141. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–19 (2000).
142. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591–92 (2012).
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
144. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
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IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION BANS
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE UNDUE BURDEN ANALYSIS
Unlike the federal government, state legislative powers are not restricted to those enumerated in the Constitution.145 Regulating abortion
and other medical procedures has long been considered within the purview
of the states.146 The one notable exception to this rule is the Federal Partial
Birth Abortion Act, discussed supra and infra.147 Neither states nor the federal government can enact laws that violate the constitution. Since Roe v.
Wade, nearly all abortion challenges have been based on Substantive Due
Process grounds.148 There have been some attempts to more firmly place the
right to abortion within the Equal Protection Clause by arguing that
women are denied access to an important medical procedure for which there
is no comparable procedure denied to men.149 Because women are a semiprotected class, framing the issue in this way would make any abortion regulation suspect and thus would have protected the right more firmly.150
However, this is not how the Court’s abortion jurisprudence has developed. Instead, the right to an abortion has been vested in the Due Process Clause and the right to privacy.151 Despite this constitutional
protection, the Supreme Court has upheld a great deal of regulation of abortion procedures.152 In the following section, I analyze how the undue burden framework enumerated in Casey might illuminate concepts underlying
the constitutionality of abortion bans based on the genetic abnormality of
the fetus. I also examine policy concerns that contravene judicial approval of
such bans.
A. Casey’s Undue Burden Analysis
In 1973, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that women have a
constitutional right (embedded within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) to receive an abortion.153 Roe created the trimester
framework, whereby a woman had complete freedom to obtain an abortion
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Compare U.S. CONST. art. IV. with U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149–50 (1973).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (Westlaw through 2013 P.L. 113–31).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 379–83 (1985).
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, 164.
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839 (1992).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
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within the first trimester of her pregnancy.154 In the second trimester, the
state was allowed to regulate certain aspects of abortions if they related to
legitimate interests, such as protecting potential life and maternal health.155
It was only in the third trimester that states were allowed to outlaw abortions, and only then if they left exceptions for the life or health of the
mother.156 Perhaps the greatest protection provided by the Court in Roe was
the strict scrutiny analysis that is guaranteed for all fundamental rights.157
Under a strict scrutiny test, any law that inappropriately restrains the right
to access an abortion (depending on which trimester the regulation affects)
is presumed unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.158
For close to twenty years after Roe, the Court struggled to define the
outer limits of the right to terminate a pregnancy, and their decisions produced some variability in the doctrine. The jurisprudence shifted dramatically in 1992, when the Court altered its analysis from trimesters to viability
through its decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.159 The Court allowed
state interference of the right to abortion before viability (whereas, under
Roe, the state could not interfere in the first trimester) so long as the state’s
regulation was not an “undue burden” on the pregnant woman and furthered a legitimate state interest.160 After viability, the Court found it constitutionally permissible to regulate without limits, which includes
completely banning abortions, so long as there was an exception for the life
of the mother.161 While this change on its own may have not altered the
substance of the law dramatically had the undue burden analysis been
strong, the Court in Casey made clear in application that the new standard
was weak.
In Casey, Planned Parenthood challenged five provisions of a state law:
(1) a requirement that a woman give informed consent twenty-four hours
before the procedure; (2) a requirement, if the patient was a minor, that at
least one parent give consent (or that the minor undergo a judicial bypass
procedure); (3) a requirement that if the patient was married, she inform
her husband; (4) a provision to exempt women in medical emergencies from
these requirements (challenged for not being broad enough); and (5) a provision that imposed reporting requirements on facilities that perform abor154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
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tions.162 Of these five provisions, only the spousal notification requirement
was struck down as unconstitutional.163
Most notably, the Supreme Court upheld the state’s mandatory
twenty-four hour waiting requirement, which it had previously deemed unconstitutional.164 Though the Court acknowledged the burden this would
impose on women, they held that it was not an undue burden under the
new test.165 This was despite the fact that the waiting period could result in
the inability of some women to reasonably get an abortion—especially
women living in rural communities, low-income women, or women who
generally lack a social support system.166 In describing the doctrine, the
Court gave the following guidance—a state can attempt to persuade women
to avoid abortions through regulation, but cannot remove their right to
choose or place a substantial obstacle in her way:
What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.
Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor,
may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has that effect on her right of
choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that
goal.167
Since Casey, the Supreme Court has only decided two abortion cases.
For this reason, there is little Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the
undue burden standard. Both cases reviewed by the Court in the aftermath
of Casey address bans on the use of the dilation and extraction (“D&X”)
abortion procedure (colloquially, and controversially, known as partial-birth
abortion).168 The D&X procedure is one of two common procedures doc162. Casey, 505 U.S. at 838.
163. Casey, 505 U.S. at 838.
164. Casey, 505 U.S. at 838; see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
165. Casey, 505 U.S. at 838–39 (“Although § 3205’s 24–hour waiting period may make
some abortions more expensive and less convenient, it cannot be said that it is invalid on the present record and in the context of this facial challenge.”).
166. Casey, 505 U.S. at 937.
167. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added).
168. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914
(2000). While the term “partial birth abortion” is used colloquially, it was developed
by the anti-choice community to incite extreme reactions. It also inadequately de-
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tors use for abortions performed after twenty weeks of pregnancy; the dilation and evacuation (“D&E”) procedure is the other technique and is
considered by some to be more humane to the fetus.169 The first D&X
abortion ban to be considered by the Court was in Stenberg, which involved
a Nebraska statute that outlawed any abortion performed with the D&X
method.170 Using the Casey undue burden analysis, the Court held that the
Nebraska statute was unconstitutional.171 The District Court in this case
had concluded that the D&X procedure was “superior to, and safer than,
the D&E and other abortion procedures used during the relevant gestational period.”172
Given these findings, the Court first held that it was an undue burden
to outlaw this procedure without a health exception. Second, the Court
held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.173 Because the statutory
language was broad enough to be potentially read to also cover D&E procedures, doctors would struggle to determine what conduct was prohibited
and might therefore cease to perform both types of procedures.174 Finally,
the Court noted that if the law was to be interpreted as a ban of both the
D&E and D&X procedures, it would certainly violate the undue burden
standard of Casey given that certain women would be unable to receive a
pre-viability abortion. Thus, this ambiguous language could lead to an unconstitutional result.175
In spite of this decision, the federal government passed a federal ban
(the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act)176 that was substantially similar to the
one deemed unconstitutional by the Court in Stenberg. This bill also
reached the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, in which the Court—
despite addressing the same challenges raised under Stenberg—found the bill
constitutional.177 In Gonzales, the Court held the bill was not unconstitutionally vague because it included a distinction between the D&X and
D&E procedures.178 This convinced the Court that the D&E procedure
would not be covered by the ban. For this reason, it held that the law did

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

scribes the actual procedure. Julie Rovner, ‘Partial-Birth Abortion:’ Separating Fact
from Spin, NPR (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.npr.org/2006/02/21/5168163/partialbirth-abortion-separating-fact-from-spin.
Rovner, supra note 168.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 914.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 914.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 915.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938, 945–46.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 945–46.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938–39.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (Westlaw through 2013 P.L. 113-31).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128 (2007).
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 149.
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not place an undue burden on women desiring second trimester, pre-viability abortions, who could always obtain a D&E procedure even if the D&X
procedure was outlawed.179
The totality of Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the undue
burden standard in Casey has only established two types of abortion regulations that are known to constitute an undue burden: (1) a spousal consent
requirement,180 and (2) a ban on both D&E and D&X abortions.181 This
jurisprudence has also demonstrated three types of abortion regulations that
do not constitute an undue burden: (1) a twenty-four hour mandatory waiting period,182 (2) a ban on the D&X procedure (even without an exception
for the health of the mother),183 and (3) a parental consent requirement for
minors (with a judicial bypass option).184 Finally, we know that a state’s
attempt to prohibit a woman from terminating her pregnancy before viability is unconstitutional.185 The tricky part lies in demarcating the line between state conduct that persuades women to avoid abortion and state
conduct that creates a substantial obstacle for women to exercise their right
to choose. Some have argued that the relative dearth of guidance from the
Supreme Court has caused lower courts to apply the undue burden standard
unpredictably.186 I propose below that while this jurisprudence might be
ambiguously applied in the judicial review of most abortion regulations, the
legal analysis should be direct and clear when applied to a disability-selective
abortion bans.
B. Undue Burden for Disability-Selective Abortions
Nearly all pre-viability abortion laws187 attempt to regulate the way in
which an abortion is procured—for instance, by mandating that a certain
waiting period elapses prior to an abortion, by requiring that certain information (or “persuasion techniques”) is offered beforehand, or by regulating
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 154–56.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992).
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 124.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 124.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–88. (“What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the
ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.”).
186. Ruth Burdick, The Casey Undue Burden Standard: Problems Predicted and Encountered, and the Split over the Salerno Test, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 825, 869
(1996).
187. Because Casey allowed for abortion bans after viability, many states have banned
post-viability abortion altogether, with exceptions for the life and health of the
mother. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 24; Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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the type of physician or facility that can offer an abortion.188 Disabilityselective abortion bans, on the other hand, explicitly outlaw pre-viability
abortions for certain women. The women singled out for this disparate
treatment are those for whom the state legislature has perceived to have less
legitimate reasons for obtaining an abortion. Because the Court in Roe, as
interpreted by Casey, held that a state cannot prohibit any women from
receiving a pre-viability abortion, I argue that reasons-based abortion bans
are a novel and aggressive intrusion on a women’s right to choose.
Despite the difficulty in predicting with certainty how courts applying
an undue burden standard will rule, a ban on abortion for genetic abnormality of the fetus (or any reasons-based ban for that matter) ought to be
comparatively straightforward. The analysis would be different if a law were
to discourage women from aborting a fetus with a genetic abnormality
through various regulations. For instance, “informed-consent” provisions
that require women to be educated about the productive life that a disabled
person could lead, mandated counseling with parents of disabled children,
or extensive waiting periods before obtaining the abortion, would all likely
be found constitutional given the current state of the law. However, a disability-based abortion ban, like the one in North Dakota, goes beyond an
attempt at persuasion and instead prohibits the abortion altogether for certain women—women seeking an abortion based on the genetic abnormality
of the fetus.
A simplistic reading of Gonzales might lead one to believe that not all
abortion bans are automatically unconstitutional.189 However, the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act is not a ban on abortions, but rather a ban on a
certain abortion procedure. It is thus better viewed as a regulation on the
type of procedure available to women seeking abortion rather than an abortion ban. This is evidenced by the Court’s holding in Stenberg that a ban of
both D&E and D&X procedures would be unconstitutional as it would
prevent certain women from obtaining a pre-viability abortion.190 Because
the Nebraska statute was unclear and could be interpreted to include both a
ban of the D&E and D&X procedures, the Court found it unconstitutional
under Roe and Casey.191 The Court in Gonzales did not overrule this central
holding in Stenberg; it distinguished the cases based on language used in the
188. See generally Tracy Conner, 40 Years After Roe v. Wade, More States Restricting Abortion, NBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2013, 8:20 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/
2013/01/21/16624980-40-years-after-roe-v-wade-more-states-restricting-abortion?
lite.
189. Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124.
190. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 945–46 (2000).
191. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 945–46.
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federal statute that clearly excluded the D&E procedure from the ban.192
This clearer language, the Court reasoned, would ensure that all women
seeking second-trimester, pre-viability abortions would be able to receive
them through the D&E technique. As the Court in Gonzales was clear that
its holding depended on the D&E procedure remaining available to
women, the Stenberg and Gonzales opinions should be read to prevent any
true pre-viability abortion ban.193
The North Dakota abortion ban goes way beyond the Nebraska statute at issue in Stenberg and actually outlaws certain pre-viability abortions.
It is therefore an explicit rejection of the Court’s holding in Roe, as interpreted by Casey, that the government cannot prevent women from obtaining a pre-viability abortion. This clearly violates the undue burden
standard, which protects a “woman’s right to make the ultimate choice.”194
Under this law, women seeking abortions due to genetic abnormality are
denied any choice. It is thus clearly an undue burden and facially
unconstitutional.
Some might argue that because a disability-based abortion ban would
only affect a small number of women, the burden placed on women generally is reasonable. An undue burden analysis, however, does not look to
women generally. In holding that the spousal consent portion of the Pennsylvania abortion law was unconstitutional, the Court in Casey found that
“the fact that [the provision] may affect fewer than one percent of women
seeking abortions does not save it from facial invalidity, since the proper
focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom it is irrelevant.”195 Thus, the analysis ought to
focus on the women who might seek these reasons-based abortions, not on
the potential undue burden on women seeking abortions as a whole. For
this narrower set of women, the state is not attempting to persuade—it is
denying them a constitutionally protected right, which violates the central
holding of Casey.196
Casey makes clear that garden-variety state interests—for instance,
protecting the health of the mother or the fetus’ potential life—are not
enough to entitle the state to prohibit any woman access to a pre-viability
abortion.197 However, proponents of these laws might argue that in the case
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 150–55.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938–39
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 837–38.
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197. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871–73 (“The woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before
viability is the most central principle of Roe . . . . It is a rule of law and a component
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of disability-selective abortions, the state’s interest is unique. In this case,
the state claims to protect the fetus’ constitutional right to equal protection
under the law.198 Under this argument, two constitutionally protected rights
would be in conflict, and there might be a reason to find an exception to the
Court’s past holding that states cannot prevent women from receiving previability abortions. This would first require proving that disability-selective
abortions are unconstitutionally discriminatory under the Equal Protection
Clause.
For many of the reasons discussed above, this argument would fail.
First, the Supreme Court does not consider fetuses to be persons entitled to
equal protection under the Constitution.199 Second, disability is not a protected class according to the Supreme Court and thus any state participation
in disability-selective abortion would be analyzed through rational basis review.200 Because there are many rational reasons why a state might permit,
or a state hospital might perform, these abortions—the most important of
which is to protect the constitutional rights of its citizens—no court would
find this state action unconstitutional. Finally, private actors commit the
vast majority of this discriminatory conduct and their actions are not covered by the Equal Protection Clause.201
It is worth noting that while North Dakota lacks a constitutional basis
to justify its disability-selective abortion ban, its interest in preventing discrimination might justify harsher abortion regulations so long as they fail to
outlaw the procedure. For instance, states can impose greater regulations on
the abortions of minors by requiring parental consent or a longer waiting
period.202 In this context, the state interest in protecting the minor is very
strong and justifies more intensive regulations. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has held that an outright ban on abortions for adolescent women is
unconstitutional; therefore, parental consent requirements must contain a
judicial bypass mechanism to ensure that young women who lack parental
consent are not denied access.203 The heightened state interest in the case of
disability-selective abortions would justify greater state regulation, but the

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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state cannot go so far as to prevent a pre-viability abortion as North Dakota
has done.
This legal analysis is bolstered by substantial policy concerns. If the
Court were to uphold a reasons-based abortion ban as constitutional, there
is a legitimate concern that such a holding would, over time, degrade the
right to abortion so significantly as to render it useless. Given that there is
no constitutional reason to view the state interest in preventing disability
discrimination of fetuses as distinct from other state interests, courts would
have no constitutional reason to invalidate other reasons-based abortion
bans once they have already approved of a disability-selective ban. Thus,
because courts would have no legal reason to invalidate other reasons-based
bans after upholding a disability-selective abortion ban, judicial approval
would enable legislatures to evaluate and legislate which reasons for obtaining an abortion are “legitimate.” Those deemed unreasonable would become illegal. This slippery slope, which would continue to degrade the
constitutional right to a pre-viability abortion, should be an intolerable result that courts are unwilling to entertain.
It is uncontroversial to acknowledge that many people judge the legitimacy of a woman’s decision to obtain an abortion based on her reasons for
the procedure. Thus, once legislatures are allowed require doctors to inquire
into a woman’s reasons (and then refuse to perform the abortion if certain
reasons are given), public opinion will begin to define and limit the right.
Some may think that the decision to pursue an abortion based on the fetus’s
genetic abnormality is fundamentally immoral or selfish given the perception that the parents may have determined that they are not willing to handle the complications that raising a child with a disability might cause them.
However, the right to a pre-viability abortion allows a woman to decide,
regardless of the reason, whether or not she wants to carry her child to
term.204 She may be too young, she may dream of going to college; she may
lack financial stability and refuse to subject herself or her child to further
financial stress. Her health may be in jeopardy or the child may be a result
of rape, in which case the last thing she may want is to have a reminder of
that experience. She might be focused on her career and not want to disrupt
her job advancement. She might not want children at all. She may learn
that her child is a girl and decide that she would prefer a son, or that her
child will have Down Syndrome, breast cancer, Attention Deficit Disorder,
asthma, acne, or brown eyes and decide to try again for a more “perfect”
child. She may not want her body to undergo the physical transformations
attendant to pregnancy. Any of these decisions—despite one’s personal
views on whether or not they are acceptable—boil down to the same ulti204. Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
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mate decision: whether a woman’s vision of the life she wants involves this
child.
Regardless of whether these judgments of other women’s decisions are
legitimate, legislatures should not be allowed to turn these subjective judgments into law. Period. The constituents in some states will find that nearly
all reasons for having an abortion are unacceptable, including lack of maturity, social network, and financial stability. However, once courts allow legislatures to enact any reasons-based abortion bans, they will have no
constitutional reason to deny other such bans. As demonstrated above, the
state’s interest in banning these abortions—preventing fetal discrimination—is constitutionally indistinguishable from its potential interest in
preventing abortions to defend potential life. Thus legitimizing a state ban
against disability-selective abortion would bring about an onslaught of these
bans. I maintain that the Constitution does not give room for this public
scrutiny. It restricts states from preventing any woman from obtaining a
pre-viability abortion for any reason.205 The Supreme Court has never
strayed from that holding and to do so now would be a grievous error.
Finally, if these bans are deemed constitutional, they will raise serious
implications for the doctor-patient relationship. Such bans would chip away
at the trust in one’s physician that everyone should expect. After receiving
the results of prenatal whole genome sequencing, women would not feel as
if they could discuss their options openly with their doctor out of fear that
doing so would limit their options later. Moreover, as prenatal whole genome sequencing does become the standard of care, any woman who engages
in the test and later decides to have an abortion—whether or not that decision is based on the test results—would be immediately suspected of doing
so for genetic reasons. If physicians could be criminalized for performing an
abortion due to the disability of the fetus, then they might not be comfortable performing an abortion on any women who has had prenatal whole
genome sequencing. Once the technology is incorporated into clinical care,
every pregnant woman will be offered this test ten weeks into her pregnancy; this could cause a huge problem for doctors trying to protect themselves from liability while also caring for the needs of their patients.
Roe as interpreted by Casey forbids legislatures from prohibiting any
woman from getting an abortion before viability.206 While there have been
bans on procedures used to perform an abortion, such bans ultimately did
not prohibit any woman from exercising her right to obtain a pre-viability
abortion (even if accessing that right became more difficult). However, if
the holding in Casey is to have any bite, the Court must continue to hold
205. Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
206. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871–72.
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that such a prohibition—regardless of the size of the affected population—
is unconstitutional. While the strength of a state’s interest can impact the
intensity with which it attempts to persuade a woman to avoid such an
abortion, it cannot override the central right to a pre-viability abortion.207
Finally, if a disability-selective abortion ban is upheld, it implicates serious
policy interests—once legislatures are allowed to decide for women whether
their reason for seeking an abortion is good enough, the foundation upon
which the right rests will disappear. Moreover, courts will lack any constitutional reason with which to distinguish a ban on disability-selective abortions from a ban on abortions due to financial hardship. They will therefore
have little power to police legislatures from enacting such bans.
CONCLUSION
Prenatal whole genome sequencing will radically change the status quo
for prenatal care in the United States. This change will likely increase the
demand for abortions based on genetic abnormality in addition to increasing the controversy accompanying them. Since these bans are already in
fashion among anti-choice state legislatures, this increased controversy will
spur the introduction of more bills that ban such abortions in states that
lack sufficient political support at the moment. Any federal disability-selective abortion ban would be enacted based on an inappropriate use of enumerated federal powers. It will raise serious implications for the principles of
federalism guaranteed by our Constitution and the Court should therefore
find it unconstitutional. Furthermore, such bans by either the state or federal governments will violate the central holding in Casey that a state cannot
prohibit any woman from getting a pre-viability abortion. Disability-selective abortion bans are thus unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.
This is the right outcome from a policy perspective as well—if courts fail to
forbid legislatures from determining when a woman’s reason for obtaining
an abortion are appropriate, certain legislatures will effectively remove the
right to an abortion by outlawing a series of “illegitimate” reasons.

207. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871–72.

